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APPEAL FROM JARNDYCE V. JARNDYCE:
THE STATE ROLE UNDER THE NATURAL
GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978
Oliver G. Richard, III*
Senator J. Bennett Johnston, a member of the House-Senate
Conference Committee charged with resolving the differences be-
tween the House and Senate versions of the natural gas bills passed
in 1977, remarked that the protracted and wearisome deliberations
of over a year's duration were not unlike those recounted in the
following passage from Charles Dickens' Bleak House, in which he
described the case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce:
The case had gone on so long that it exhausted finances, pa-
tience, courage, hope; so overthrew the brain and broke the
heart; that there was not an honourable man among its practi-
tioners [conferees] who would not give-who did not often give
-the warning, "suffer any wrong that can be done to you rather
than come here!"'
The modern day comparison of the federal government's regula-
tion of natural gas to the Jarndyce case is indeed an apt one. Its
regulation has truly exhausted the "finances, patience, courage and
hope" of both the regulators and the regulated.2 This article focuses
*J.D., Louisiana State University Law Center, Legislative Assistant to J. Bennett
Johnston, United States Senate.
1. Johnston, The Natural Gas Compromise, The Baltimore Sun, July 8, 1978, §
A, at 6, quoting C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 186 (Signet ed. 1964). Senator Russell Long
described the gas bill in a more modern context:
Mr. President, I saw the old show, "Beverly Hillbillies" when it was current on
television. The picture was shown of old Pa out in Arkansas firing his rifle into
the ground and oil gushed out. The family became rich and moved to Beverly
Hills. Mr. President, under this bill, finding gas would only be the beginning of
the Beverly Hillbillies worries.
124 CONG. REC. S14,592 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Long). For a terse,
but excellent review of federal natural gas pricing policies and politics, see Bethell,
The Gas Price Fixers, HARPER'S, June 1979, at 37.
2. Charles Curtis, Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), is reported as testifying during the debate on the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978 (NGPA) that the Commission had a pending backlog of 9,807 producer rate filings
and 3,012 producer certificate cases attributable only to the regulatory requirements
under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA). 124 CONG. REC. S15,227 (daily ed. Sept. 15,
1978) (remarks of Charles Curtis).
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on the state's role in the natural gas regulatory scheme set up by
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).
REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS PRIOR TO THE NGPA
Federal
In the 1920's natural gas, generally discovered in combination
with crude oil, was often flared due to the lack of developed
markets. Consumer recognition of this inexpensive fuel, coupled
with the perfection of the seamless steel pipe which enabled gas to
be shipped at high compression for long distances, resulted in the
creation of markets miles from the wellhead.' Unfortunately, con-
comitant with this development, problems arose due to the small
number of powerful holding companies that had gained monopolistic
control over the limited number of interstate pipeline systems. This
situation was further aggravated by circumstances conducive to
monopoly at the production. end. Due to the initial low field prices
and the fact that the pipeline companies themselves owned produc-
tion, the producer was often forced to sell his gas at distressed
prices. Thus, the potential existed for the interstate pipeline "mid-
dleman" to exact exorbitant prices at the expense of both the pro-
ducer and the consumer.' Clearly the need for governmental in-
tervention existed.
As a result of prior Supreme Court decisions, state regulatory
commissions were precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the
regulation of prices paid to interstate pipelines;' additionally, the
federal government lacked regulatory jurisdiction.' Recognizing the
need to eliminate this regulatory lacuna, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) recommended to Congress a regulatory scheme which
would complement the state's affirmed ability to regulate the sales
3. The exploration for natural gas has become a separate enterprise primarily as
a result of the expansion of these pipelines; indeed, less than twenty-five percent of all
gas produced comes from oil wells. See C. HAWKINS, THE FIELD PRICE REGULATION OF
NATURAL GAS 221 (1969).
4. Conine & Niebrugge, Dedication Under the Natural Gas Ac" Extent and
Escape, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 735, 738 (1977). This article is highly recommended for a
detailed history and analysis of federal regulation of the natural gas market vis-a-vis
the state regulatory scheme prior to passage of the NGPA. For an overview of the old
Federal Power Commission, see L. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS, WATCHDOG AGENCIES
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 187-202 (1969).
5. Public Utils. Comm'n of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S.
83 (1927); Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924).
6. Natural gas pipelines were excluded from the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, which regulated oil pipelines only. 49 U.S.C. § 1(1)(b) (1976).
FERC now regulates both, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 7172(a)(b) & (c) (1979).
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of "once interstate gas" after it had entered the state.' In response,
Congress passed the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA).' The NGA re-
sulted from a congressional determination that the "business of
transporting and selling natural gas for ultimate distribution to the
public is affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation
• . .is necessary in the public interest.."9
The argument can be advanced that, in limiting the scope of the
NGA to the pipeline link between production and distribution, Con-
gress chose to exempt from federal controls those two sectors of the
natural gas industry. Underlying this argument is the concept of
federalism, whereby states possess the power to regulate the prop-
erty and activities of persons within their boundaries. It appeared
that Congress, after its assertion of power over the interstate com-
merce aspects of the natural gas industry, had left the regulation of
intrastate gas markets to the states. However, sixteen years after
the passage of the NGA, the Supreme Court, in Phillips Petroleum
Corp. v. Wisconsin,0 indicated that the power of the states to
regulate the intrastate market was not absolute. The Court held
that sales by producers to interstate pipelines were "sales for
resale" within the ambit of the Act and, thus, the Federal Power
Commission (FPC)" had the power to regulate them. More specifically,
the Court held that the production and gathering exemption'2 did
not nullify the authority granted the FPC to regulate interstate
sales by producers." Subsequently, the FPC began the arduous task
7. 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1976). The report itself is FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
FINAL REPORT, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 84-A (1936).
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(a)-(w) (1976).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1976).
10. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
11. Pursuant to the provisions of the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 7101-352 (1977), the Federal Power Commission (FPC) ceased to exist and
its functions and regulatory responsibilities were transferred to the Secretary of
Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an independent com-
mission within the Department of Energy (DOE).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976).
13. After Phillips, and prior to passage of the NGPA, provisions forbidding the
pumping of gas into interstate commerce had been a precautionary device written into
gas contracts. A typical pre-NGPA commingling clause read:
Interstate: Buyer represents and agrees that the gas delivered to Buyer here-
under will be gas transported and sold entirely within the State of __ and will
not have been commingled with any gas destined for transportation, sale, or use
in interstate commerce. Buyer shall be entitled to grant to __ (third party)
the right to make sales of a limited term for the transportation and resale outside
the State of __ to an interstate market provided that such sales would not be
subject to the jurisdictional consequences of federal administrative and legislative
actions. If such sale is found to be subject to Federal jurisdiction, this contract
19801
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of setting "just and reasonable" rates," utilizing three methods of
price calculation: (1) treating producers as individual public utilities
by setting limits on prices which reflected the cost of service plus a
reasonable rate of return;" (2) setting ceiling prices based on the
cost of producing gas in certain geographical areas; 6 and (3) setting
prices on a competitive "national area rate,"-a rate roughly
equivalent to then existing intrastate rates.'7 In response to
forecasts of severe shortages of natural gas during the winters of
1975-77, and to Congressional dissatisfaction with the NGA
regulatory scheme's inability to insure an adequate supply of gas for
the interstate market, the Senate passed the first Pearson-Bentsen
deregulation amendment to the emergency provisions of S. 2310 in
October of 1975.1" In February of 1976, the Krueger-Brown deregula-
tion attempt in the House almost succeeded in winning approval. 9
Finally, presidential candidate Jimmy Carter wrote a letter to the
governors of three producing states promising, if elected, to "work
with the Congress, as the Ford Administration has been unable to
do, to deregulate new natural gas. [D]eregulation of new gas would
encourage sales in the interstate market and help lessen the pros-
pects of shortages in the non-producing states which rely on in-
terstate supplies.""0
shall terminate automatically twenty-four (24) hours preceding such sale.
Gas Purchase Contract, September 1977 (copy on file with Louisiana Law Review).
FERC now has the authority to prohibit this type of clause as "against public policy
and unenforceable" as it pertains to gas governed by the NGPA, 15 U.S.C.A. § 3374
(1978).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1976).
15. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
16. The area rate methodology was upheld in The Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
17. The methodology of determining the rate was upheld in American Public Gas
Ass'n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Tenneco Oil Co. v. FERC, 571
F.2d 834 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
18. 121 CONG. REC. S33,655 (1975) (Senate vote). S. 2310 contained two parts: Title
One was to provide emergency relief during the winter to high priority users unable to
obtain sufficient amounts from their suppliers. Title Two would have permanently
deregulated the price of new natural gas found onshore, effective April 5, 1976; new off-
shore, effective January 1, 1981. The House instead passed a bill deregulating small
producers and increasing regulation of major producers. No conference committee was
held on the two bills, leaving as then-Congressman Krueger called it, "[a]nother year
under the logically bankrupt system of Federal price controls." H.R. REP. No. 543, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
19. The vote on H.R. 9464 is located at 122 CONG. REC. H2656 (1976). The real test
vote, however, was on the Smith Substitute to the Krueger Substitute which passed
205-201. 122 CONG. REC. H2648-49 (1976).
20. 124 CONG. REC. S15,219 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Bartlett).
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Louisiana Regulation
While the interstate battle raged in Congress, the courts, and
the FPC, regulation in the intrastate market proceeded peacefully.
As the Supreme Court noted, "The Natural Gas Act was designed to
supplement state power and to produce a harmonious and com-
prehensive regulation of the industry. Neither state nor federal
regulatory body was to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the
other."21
The regulatory authority to oversee oil and gas operations in
Louisiana is vested generally in the Secretary of the Department of
Natural Resources;2 2 more specifically, however, the authority with
respect to the regulation, conservation, and use of oil and gas rests
with the Office of Conservation. 2' The state has had a long and suc-
cessful history of regulating the production of oil and gas, which has
ensured that these finite resources were produced utilizing the best
conservation methods available. The state's first concerted effort
towards regulating production occurred in 1924.24 The action dealt
with well spacing and mandated such activities as keeping well logs,
casing wells, plugging dry wells, and testing and metering gas pro-
duction. Legislation in later years added to and amalgamated existing
laws to establish a fully comprehensive regulatory structure now
contained in title 30 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. The major
premise of this title is that oil and gas are valuable finite resources
whose waste should be prohibited by the state.
The definition of "waste" is purposely broad. It encompasses not
only its ordinary meaning of physical waste but also such actions as
the spacing, locating, drilling, equipping, or operating of wells in a
manner which could result in reducing the ultimately recoverable
gas from a pool "tending to or causing unnecessary and excessive
surface loss and producing gas from a pool in excess of market
transportation and demand."" Although general statutory authority
exists for the Conservation Commissioner to issue reasonable rules
and regulations necessary to properly administer and enforce the
prevention of waste, additional specific powers are given to him.
Among the more important ones are his authority: (1) to require
21. FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 513 (1949).
22. LA. R.S. 36:351 (1950 & Supp. 1979).
23. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 16(A); LA. CONST. art. VI, § 1(c) (1921). The Commis-
sioner of Conservation has the responsibility for exercising these powers. He may
issue rules, regulations, and orders to carry out his duties pursuant to LA. R.S. 30:4-6
& 8 (1950 & Supp. 1979).
24. 1924 La. Acts, No. 252.
25. LA. R.S. 30:3(1) (1950).
1980]
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drilling, casing, and plugging; (2) to require operators of wells to
have efficient gas-oil ratios; (3) to regulate secondary recovery
methods; and (4) to regulate spacing of wells into established drilling
units." The power of the Commissioner to extensively regulate gas
operations in the state, under the broad mandate of preventing
waste, often deprives landowners and producers of much of their
freedom to exploit hydrocarbons as they see fit. Illustrative of this
is the power to order the unitization of separately owned interests
in an oil or gas field."
Overseeing the oil and gas operations in Louisiana is no small
undertaking. In 1977 the state ranked first in the nation in the
marketed production of natural gas, contributing approximately forty
percent of the total domestically produced natural gas moved in-
terstate.
2 8
Federal/State Relationship
During his candidacy, President Carter impliedly recognized the
importance of the gas producing states' roles in regulating gas
within their borders by favoring legislation to decontrol new gas,
thereby returning to the states a portion of the power that,
arguably, had been taken away from them by the Phillips decision."
In the report accompanying the transmittal of his National Energy
Plan (NEP) to Congress, President Carter noted:
A national energy plan can be built only on a foundation of
partnership and understanding among the federal government,
[and] the states . . . which regulate or own a substantial part of
United States energy resources. Many of the programs proposed
26. LA. R.S. 30:4 (1950 & Supp. 1979).
27. LA. R.S. 30:9 & 10 (1950). Unitization allows property lines to be ignored in
order to prevent separate interest owners from exploiting the underlying minerals
without regard to prudent conservation practices and the rights of adjoining property
owners. Alfred Kahn once described what would happen without unitization by
analogizing it to the placing of an ice cream soda with several straws before a group of
small boys. J. BLAIR, THE CONTROL OF OIL 154 (1976). The power of the state through
the commissioner to unitize lands and deprive the landowner of his right to drill wells
upon his land and produce minerals was affirmed in Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 202 La. 97,
11 So. 2d 495 (1942), appeal dismissed, 320 U.S. 222 (1943).
28. AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, GAS FACTS RECORD OF GAS UTILITY IINDUSTRY
(1978). Producing wells in Louisiana numbered 12,484.
29. See generally Flittie & Armour, The Natural Gas Act Experience-A Study
in Regulatory Aggression and Congressional Failure to Control the Legislative Pro-
cess, 19 Sw. L.J. 448 (1965); Comment, Independent Natural Gas Producers, the FPC
and the Courts: A Case of Judicial Intermeddling, 53 TEx. L. REv. 784 (1975).
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in the Plan cannot succeed without the active cooperation of
state and local governments."
However, much to the chagrin of gas producing states, the NEP
called for legislation to do away with what was called the "[airtificial
distinction between interstate and intrastate markets" which had
become "unworkable, indeed intolerable, as the amount of new gas
increasingly flow[ed] to the unregulated intrastate markets at the
expense of interstate consumers."'" The NEP proposed an extension
of federal price controls to the intrastate market to eliminate this
artificial distinction. Thus, the existing and future supplies of gas
not previously committed or dedicated to the interstate market
under the NGA, and therefore regulated exclusively by the states,
would now come under the aegis of the FPC. This proposal led the
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to comment that, while the
NEP called for "active roles and major responsibilities for state and
local governments, with few exceptions, however, it is not clear
what these roles and responsibilities are to be. In fact, by emphasiz-
ing the leadership role of the federal government and largely ignor-
ing problems of intergovernmental cooperation, the Plan appears to
downgrade the importance of other levels of government in energy
decisionmaking." This was especially important because "[iun some
cases they [the states] lose powers they now have .... "32
While citing numerous examples contained in the NEP of the
reduction in the present role played by state governments," the
OTA report nonetheless stressed the fact that states would be
assigned a central role in the regulation of surface mining, reclama-
tion, resource extraction, electricity pricing and transmission,
energy facility siting, and the enforcement of mineral rights laws on
non-federally-owned land. Adding to this list the leadership roles in
energy conservation and comprehensive energy planning that some
states had already assumed, the report suggested that "a 'new
federalism' has been formed in recent years in which the states have
been restored to a full policymaking partnership with the Federal
30. THE NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENERGY
POLICY AND PLANNING 89 (1977) [hereinafter NEP].
31. Id. at 52-53.
32. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL
ENERGY PLAN 174-175 (1977) [hereinafter cited as OTA ANALYSIS].
33. Examples of situations in which states are essentially treated by the plan as
enforcers of federal laws and standards include: federal building standards, NEP supra
note 30, at 40; coal, nuclear, and hydroelectric power. Id. at 63. Areas in which states
are treated as mere allocators of federal funds include: grants for building conserva-
tion, id. at 42; and grants for municipal solid waste programs. Id. at 77.
1980]
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Government."', Notwithstanding the NEP, federal/state coordination
had been encouraging. 5
Delegation of certain federal responsibilities to the states is one
means of effectuating a national energy policy. 6 The NGPA's delega-
tion of authority to the states appears to satisfy the objectives of
the federal government in working as a partner with the states to
qualify gas for federal price ceilings, while at the same time
avoiding infringement upon the state's historic conservation role. 7
The maintenance of this delicate balance should not preempt state
regulation and make the state agency a mere appendage of the
federal government. 8 The ability of the state to work within its
historic arena concurrently with the federal government is feasible
as long as the federal agencies understand the symbiotic relation-
ship involved. During debate on the Act, for example, there was
much discussion about providing a statutory requirement that
natural gas producers operate their properties as "prudent
operators."39 While enforcement of this requirement would have
been performed exclusively by a state regulatory agency, the pro-
34. OTA ANALYSIS, supra note 32, at 177.
35. Federal air and water pollution control statutes give the states initial authority
to develop and implement plans for achieving environmental standards subject to
federal review. Pollution statutes, e.g., the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7101-352
(1977), were passed because of the failure of state initiatives in the area. Compare to
this situation, however, the prior existence of Louisiana's gas regulatory scheme. See
generally Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
36. One of the most vivid examples of the type of federal-state coordination that
will have to occur in the future on energy matters is the Emergency Energy Conserva-
tion Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-102, 93 Stat. 749. The Act contains provisions whereby
the federal government sets energy reduction targets for each state based on its
historic use of energy. The state then has the option of voluntarily reducing its energy
usage to meet the target. After a grace period, should the state fail, the federal
government will impose a federal conservation plan on the state.
37. The goal is not insurmountable. Former Governor Edwards has commented on
the state/federal consultation in solid and hazardous waste regulatory development
that:
From the State's perspective, RCRA (the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act), is a landmark in that the statute: ...emphasizes the States' continuing
primacy in solid waste management, while allowing a State's solid waste program
to be based on minimum Federal criteria for solid waste disposal facilities, yet
maintains the integrity of the State's permit and enforcement programs.
Edwards, A Hopeful Sign, EPA J. 9 (1979).
38. The NGPA's delegation authority is contained in section 503, 15 U.S.C.A. §
3413 (1979). The power of Congress to delegate this authority to state officials is con-
stitutionally permissible, provided it does not impose upon the states imperative
obligations. Parker v. Richard, 250 U.S. 235, 239 (1919).
39. Part VI "Producer Regulation" compromise offered to the Senate Conferees
by Senator Johnston on December 22, 1977 (copy on file with Louisiana Law Review).
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posed enforcement plan would first need Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) approval."0 The "prudent operator rule," if not
already statutorily recognized in gas producing states, is certainly a
judicially recognzied standard of good faith in carrying out the
terms of natural gas leases.4' The provision was defeated by the con-
ferees early in the conference. 2 While Congress debated the matter,
the federal judiciary was reviewing FERC's authority43 to require
producers to act as "prudent operators" in developing and maintain-
ing the deliverability of their gas reserves. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that FERC had overstepped
its authority by transgressing the specific exclusion from its
jurisdiction of the production and gathering of natural gas." The
Supreme Court upheld the decision, leaving to the states those mat-
ters technically involved with the deliverability of gas from reser-
voirs.15
Section 505 of the NGPA also recognizes that states continue to
have the primary authority and power to regulate gas production
within their historic sphere.' Thus, although the state's power in
40. Id.
41. "A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but he is
bound to perform his contract in good faith and to develop and operate the property
leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his
lessor." LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:122 (Supp. 1974). For a discussion of the prudent
operator rule in Texas, Oklahoma and New Mexico, see Clayton v. Atlantic Refining
Co., 150 F. Supp. 9 (D.C. N.M. 1957).
42. ACTIVITY REPORT OF THE HOUSE AD Hoc COMM. ON ENERGY H.R. REP. No.
95-1820, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-59 (1979) [hereinafter cited as STATUS REPORT].
43. See 18 C.F.R. § 157.41 (1979).
44. Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n. 566 F.2d 536 (5th Cir.
1978).
45. The Fifth Circuit had noted in its opinion: "To hold that the power to issue
Order No. 539-B is within the jurisdiction of the FERC would all but eliminate the
'production and gathering' exclusion and would allow the FERC to encroach on areas
reserved to the states. We cannot so extend the authority of the Commission." Id. at
540-41.
46. 15 U.S.C.A. § 3415 (1978) provides:
(a) Authority to intervene.
(1) Intervention as matter of right. The Secretary of Energy may intervene
as a matter of right in any proceeding relating to the prorationing of, or other
limitations upon, natural gas production which is conducted by any State agency
having regulatory jurisdiction over the production of natural gas.
(2) Enforcement of right to intervene. The Secretary may bring an action in
any appropriate court of the United States to enforce his right to intervene under
paragraph (1).
(3) Access to information. As an intervenor in a proceeding described in
subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary shall have access to information avail-
able to other parties to the proceeding if such information is relevant to the
issues to which his participation in such proceeding relates. Such information may
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the field is not unlimited, the intent of Congress in enacting the
NGPA appears to have been to establish ceiling prices only, leaving
conservation matters to the states.
The President's NEP, with few changes, proceeded through the
House of Representatives in less than one hundred days.'7 The
Senate, however, divided the NEP into five parts and voted on them
separately.'8 While the House had called for increased regulation of
natural gas, the Senate, after a filibuster of thirteen legislative
days, voted to deregulate new interstate gas. 9 The Conference Com-
mittee began work on reconciling these two disparate bills and, on
November 9, 1978, the NGPA was signed into law by the President.
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE NGPA
The legislative framework of the NGPA is substantially dif-
ferent from that of the previously controlling NGA. As stated in the
introduction to the regulations implementing the Act, "the Natural
Gas Act had in many respects been limited, replaced or superseded
by the NGPA, although it continues to be of significance with
respect to gas previously dedicated to interstate commerce."50 The
most evident change from the NGA is the "substitution of a series
of specific statutory maximum price levels applicable to discrete
types of first sales of natural gas for the previously established
system of price regulation of interstate sales of natural gas which
had been grounded in a cost-based (utility-type) methodology."5 The
be obtained through reasonable rules relating to discovery of information
prescribed by the State agency.
(b) Access to State courts.
(1) Review in State courts. The Secretary may obtain review of any deter-
mination made in any proceeding described in subsection (a)(1) of this section in
the appropriate State court if the Secretary intervened or otherwise participated
in the original proceeding or if State law otherwise permits such review.
(2) Participation as amicus curiae. In addition to his authority to obtain
review under paragraph (1), the Secretary may also participate in amicus curiae in
any judicial review of any proceeding described in subsection (a)(1) of this section.
As Congressman Dingall noted during the-floor debate on the NGPA conference
report: this intervention authority does not grant the Secretary any substantive
powers or displace any state authority. 124 CONG. REC. H13,119 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978)
(remarks by Rep. Dingall).
47. STATUS REPORT, supra note 42, at 21 & 35.
48. NEP was originally introduced as S. 1469. S. 2104 contained the natural gas
pricing proposal and was reported out of the Energy Committee on September 7, 1977
without recommendation.
49. 123 CONG. REC. S16323 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1977).
50. II FED. ENERGY GUIDELINES, FERC, STATS. AND REGS. 30,026 [hereinafter cited
as ENERGY GUIDELINES].
51. Id.
[Vol. 41
NA TURAL GAS POLICY A CT
most important distinction concerning producer regulation under the
two Acts, however, is the expansion of the FERC's jurisdictional
scope to encompass sales in the intrastate market.
The NGPA is divided into six subchapters. The two most rele-
vant in regard to the state regulatory role are subchapter one, con-
cerning pricing determinations, and subchapter five, concerning ad-
ministrative review and enforcement.52 Subchapter one delineates
the regulations controlling the pricing of first sales of gas anywhere
in the United States. Under the framework of this subchapter, there
exist two major categories of first sales: (1) those sales requiring a
prior determination of eligibility," which must be made by a
federal" or state jurisdictional agency before the collection of the
maximum lawful price is permitted; and (2) those sales explicitly not
requiring such a determination. In order for the producer to take ad-
vantage of the higher pricing provisions of the NGPA, notably
under sections 102, 103, 107, or 108, the state conservation commis-
sion must first make the determination that indeed his gas can be
classified as falling under at least one of the named sections. The
statutory authorization enabling the producer to have his gas
classified at the state level, subject to approval at the federal level,
is contained in section 503.11
52. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3311-20; §§ 3411-16 (1978).
53. These categories are: "New Gas," 15 U.S.C.A. § 3312 (1979); Gas from "New
Onshore Production Wells," 15 U.S.C.A. § 3313 (1979); "High-Cost Natural Gas," 15
U.S.C.A. § 3317 (1979); and "Stripper Well Natural Gas," 15 U.S.C.A. § 3318 (1979). A
producer may seek the highest priced classification, although his gas may fall under
more than one category, 15 U.S.C.A. § 3311(b) (1979). Original section numbers of the
Act are referred to in this article as contemporary legislative history refers to them.
The corresponding statutory section numbers are provided in the accompanying foot-
notes. Thus, as cited later in the text: "New Gas" in the original Act was § 102; "New
Onshore," § 103; "High-Cost," § 107; and "Stripper," § 108.
54. The federal jurisdictional agency is the United States Geological Survey
(USGS) for new gas located on the outercontinental shelf as well as on onshore federal
lands. Under 18 C.F.R. § 274.501(d) (1979), the USGS may agree with the state jurisdic-
tional agency to allow that state agency to make determinations, although the gas is
located on federal lands within the state.
55. 15 U.S.C.A. § 3413 (1978). Thus, except for the gas which was committed or
dedicated by November 8, 1978, the current NGA regulatory scheme would be ter-
minated. For new sales in interstate commerce, the producer need not dedicate new
gas reserves nor seek abandonment permission from FERC in order to sell to another
purchaser upon termination of the contractual term (with the exception of the "right of
first refusal: contained in 15 U.S.C. § 3375(b) (1979)). The Commission may set "just
and reasonable" rates above the maximum lawful ceiling price in two instances: to en-
courage investment in wells involving high risks and high costs, 15 U.S.C. § 3317(b)
(1979); and when the Commission deems it necessary to permit rate relief in the form
of adjustments under 15 U.S.C.A. § 3412(c) (1979).
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State Determinations Under the NGPA
Section 503(c)(1) provides that a state agency having regula-
tory jurisdiction with respect to the production of natural gas is
authorized (unless that right is waived under section 503(c)(2)) to
make determinations referred to in subsection (2)."e The state deter-
mination, unless reversed by FERC under section 503(b), allows the
producer to collect prices for that gas up to the statutory ceilings
contained in the NGPA5
The regulations implementing the NGPA add two new sub-
chapters to chapter one of title 18 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions. 8 Subchapter 14 contains new producer regulations. Those
relevant to the present discussion include: part 270, which sets forth
general rules applicable to the entire subchapter; part 271, contain-
ing the maximum lawful prices allowed under sections 102 through
109; and parts 274 and 275, which provide for determinations of
eligibility by state agencies and FERC review of those determina-
tions.
According to part 274.501, a state jurisdictional agency has
NGPA classification authority if the well's surface location is within
a state's borders, onshore and offshore. 9 Louisiana's designated
agency is the Conservation Commission, which filed its report with
FERC stating that "it will take such steps as are reasonably
necessary or appropriate to perform its functions" under the
56. 15 U.S.C.A. § 3413(c) (1979).
57. The Office of Pipeline and Producer Regulation (OPPR) within FERC is
responsible for assuring that the determinations of the various jurisdictional agencies
are properly made. 18 C.F.R. § 3.5(f) (1979). Within the OPPR is the Division of NGPA
Compliance which performs producer audits. If the investigating staff finds possible in-
fractions of the NGPA regulations, the Division will turn the case over to the FERC
Office of Enforcement, which is responsible for litigation involving civil and criminal
penalties. Section 3314 generally makes it unlawful for any person to sell natural gas
at a first sale price in excess of any applicable maximum lawful price or to otherwise
violate any provision, rule, or order of the Act. Final determinations of state and
federal agencies are binding on that gas and are not subject to further FERC or
judicial review by a Court of Appeal, unless a misstatement or ommission of a material
fact was made in the agency's determination of the gas classification by the producer.
15 U.S.C.A. § 3413(d) (1978). There is, in this case, no statute of limitations. The pro-
cedure for reopening a determination is contained in 18 C.F.R. § 275.205 (1979). The
NGPA, unlike the NGA, also grants the power to assess civil penalties. 15 U.S.C.A. §
3414(b)(6)(A) (1979).
58. Where possible, final regulations issued through April of 1980 are taken into
account in this section's discussion.
59. 18 C.F.R. § 274.501(a)(2) (1979). For federal lands within Louisiana, the jurisdic-
tional agency is the Area Oil and Gas Supervisor in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
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NGPA." Although the NGPA allows the agency to use its state pro-
cedures, part 274.105 requires it to include in its initial report cer-
tain information specifying the manner in which the determinations
will be made. FERC requires the following seven items to be included
in the state report: ' (1) filing requirements imposed by the state
agency above those FERC requires the producer to file with the
jurisdictional agency under subpart B;12 (2) the type of notice ap-
plicants must give to purchasers;"' (3) the public notice that will be
given by the agency of filings, hearings, and determinations;"4 (4) the
internal procedures the agency will use in making its determina-
tions, including the use of hearings and formal consideration by the
agency;"6 (5) the extent to which parties may intervene or otherwise
express views in proceedings before the agency;" (6) a description of
the relevant data contained in the agency's official records; 7 and, (7)
a detailed explanation of the manner in which the agency will
review applications.
MINIMUM FERC FILING REQUIREMENTS
FERC's minimum filing requirements are important because of
the scope of its review over the state finding. By directing what the
producer will file at the state agency level, FERC can, in effect, dic-
60. Id. at § 274.105 (1979). FERC gave notice of Louisiana's Conservation Commis-
sion's compliance and the acceptance of its report in 43 Fed. Reg. 57,331 (1978).
61. 18 C.F.R. § 274.105 (1979).
62. Id. at § 274.105(a)(1) (1979). Louisiana requires the producer to submit, in addi-
tion to FERC form 121, certain Conservation Commission forms numbered the same as
the respective determination sought, e.g., Form No. 102 is for new gas. Applications
may be filed at the district office where the well is located. Relevant information must
be filed with accompanying affidavits as well as a $100 filing fee per application. See
LA. OFFICE OF CONSERVATION, PRACTICES & PROCEDURES, rules 2.2-4 & 6 [hereinafter
cited as LA. RULES].
63. 18 C.F.R. § 274.105(a)(2) (1979). LA. RULE 2.5 requires the applicant to certify
that all purchasers have been served, at least by mail, with a copy of the application.
64. 18 C.F.R. § 274.105(a)(3) (1979). The Commissioner sets a hearing, then
publishes the notice in the Louisiana Register 10 days before the hearing with the
description of the classification sought. LA. RULES 2.5 & 7 & 4.1.
65. 18 C.F.R. § 274.105(a)(4) (1979). Provided no protest is filed, the application
may be approved by informal deposition. The Commissioner may require an eviden-
tiary hearing upon his own motion. If the reservoir under NGPA section 102(c)(1)(C)
has not been the subject of a unitization hearing, the Commissioner will require a for-
mal hearing. LA. RULE 4.4.
66. 18 C.F.R. § 274.105(a)(5) (1979). LA. RULES 4.3 and 4.5 allow interested parties
to file protests to the producer's application either before or at the hearing. The pro-
testor is essentially a party to the hearing and has a right to be heard, present
witnesses, and be represented by legal counsel.
67. 18 C.F.R. § 274.105(a)(6) (1979).
68. Id. at § 274.105(a)(6) & (7) (1979).
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tate in advance what it determines will be the kind and amount of
evidence that will constitute "substantial evidence in the record
upon which such determination was made."69 The legislative history
is clear that, although Congress allowed FERC to specify the form
and content of NGPA filings before the state agency, this authority
was limited by the caveat that its right of review is confined to the
"narrow question of whether or not the agency determination is sup-
ported by substantial evidence" and that there was no intention to
allow FERC to "second guess the agency by independently weighing
the evidence . . . as if the initial responsibility were placed in the
Commission.""°
The four categories which the state may determine are discussed
below. Generally, all four require a standardized FERC form 121
which requires information such as well location and operation, a
sworn statement that the information contained therein is correct,
and a description of the applicant's diligent search of all records
relative to the category sought."
New Gas
New onshore gas may be gas produced from a well: (1) 2.5 miles
from a marker well, (2) 1,000 feet deeper than a marker well within
2.5 miles, or (3) which is drilled in a new reservoir."2 Under the first
two categories the producer must file a location plat of his well and
any other well within the 2.5-mile radius which has produced gas
after January 1, 1970. If any other wells are so identified, the appli-
cant must prove they are not marker wells by a demonstration that
none produced gas in commercial quantities from January, 1970
through April 20, 1977."M Unlike the relatively simple objective
measurement data required for the first two categories, the new
reservoir definition is more subjective, depending on geological and
engineering evidence. Thus more substantiation is required in the
form of well logs, formation structure maps, well potential tests, and
69. § 503(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. § 3413(b)(1)(A) (1979).
70. ENERGY GUIDELINES supra note 50, at 3126 (statement of managers).
71. ENERGY GUIDELINES supra note 50, at 30,207. Records include, but are not
limited to, production, state severance tax, and royalty payment records. Louisiana's
Administrative Procedure Act contains detailed rules for adjudication proceedings
which allow for judicial notice of generally recognized technical or scientific facts
within the agency's specialized knowledge, as well as for authority to exclude incompe-
tent, irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence, LA. R.S. 49:956(1) (Supp.
1966). Section 503(c)(3) of the NGPA allows the state agency to use its normal pro-
cedures, limited by FERC's authority, to prescribe the form and content of the filings.
72. New gas or gas from "new onshore wells" is defined in 15 U.S.C.A. §
3312(c)(1)(B) (1979). A "marker well" is defined at 15 U.S.C.A. § 3301(5) (1979).
73. 18 C.F.R. § 274.202 (c)(1)(i) to (iv) (1979).
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other geological data."' The producer must also declare whether gas
was produced in commercial quantities from the reservoir prior to
April 20, 1977 and whether it was penetrated before that date by an
old well (drilled before March 19, 1977) from which gas or oil was
produced in commercial quantities from any penetrated reservoir."5
If the second part is answered in the affirmative, the producer must
declare whether gas could have been produced in commercial quan-
tities before April 20, 1977, from any identified old well. If gas
could have been produced before this date from an old well, that
fact will prevent its being classified as new under the NGPA if
suitable facilities for its production and delivery to a pipeline were
in existence on April 20, 1977. 7 This is the "withheld gas exclusion,"
the purpose of which was to prevent gas producers from obtaining
the higher NGPA new gas prices by withholding gas in anticipation
of the Act's passage."
New Onshore Production Well Gas
This category was created by the Conference Committee to
allow for development of geological structures similiar to the San
Juan Basin in New Mexico where, in order to increase production
from reservoir rocks with low permeability, additional wells needed
to be drilled."
To classify, the producer must declare that the well is new
(spudded after April 19, 1977), satisfies any applicable federal or
state well-spacing requirements,"0 and is not within a proration unit
74. Id. at § 274.202(d)(i) to (vi) (1979).
75. Id. at § 274.202(d)(2)(i) & (ii)(A) (1979).
76. Id. at § 274.202(d)(2)(ii)(B) (1979).
77. Id. at § 274.202(d)(2)(ii)(C) & (D) (1979).
78. Id. The concern that producers would benefit from "withheld gas" permeated
the debate on the NGPA. Rep. Collins noted early in the Act's history: "Most shut-in
gas is, however, gas that the producer cannot deliver because there is no nearby
pipeline." He also noted the Louisiana Department of Conservation reported that in
January, 1977, 500 wells were shut in. Of the 500, 474 or 94.9 percent were awaiting
pipeline connection while the remaining 26 wells or 5.1 percent had not been produc-
tion tested in order to determine their potential delivery capacity. H.R. REP. No. 543,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11,334.
79. In 1976, half of all extension (developmental) drillings were successful. STAFF
OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND POWER, COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, 95 TH CONG., 2D SESS., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF H.R. 5289, NATURAL GAS POLICY
ACT OF 1978 9 (Comm. Print). New onshore production wells are defined in 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 3314(c)(1)(B) (1979).
80. If a jurisdictional agency alters or grants a waiver of, any applicable well-
spacing requirements prior to the commencement of surface drilling of the well
for which a determination is sought, the new well shall be deemed to satisfy any
applicable Federal or State well-spacing requirements required by section 103(c)(2)
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in existence at the time the drilling of the well was begun, which
unit is applicable to the reservoir from which such gas is produced
and which unit applied to any other well which either produced gas
in commercial quantities or the surface drilling of which was begun
before February 19, 1977, and was thereafter capable of producing
gas in commercial quantities." If the producer wants to qualify gas
from a new well drilled into an existing proration unit, additional
regulations must be satisfied.2
High-Cost Gas
The high-cost category relevant to Louisiana is that gas found
below 15,000 feet. Qualification under the regulations is relatively
simple, requiring the submission of proof of the required depth. 3
Stripper Well Gas
This gas is defined8' as nonassociated gas produced during any
month if, during the well's preceding 90-day production period, it
produced an average of 60 mcf or less per production day at its max-
imum efficient rate of flow determined in accordance with recognized
conservation practices designed to maximize the ultimate recovery
of natural gas.85 What constitutes recognized conservation practices
of the NGPA.
18 C.F.R. § 271.304 (1979).
81. Id. at § 274.204 (1979).
82. The applicant must file evidence to demonstrate by "appropriate geological
evidence and engineering data that the new well is necessary to effectively and effi-
ciently drain a portion of the reservoir covered by the proration unit which cannot be
effectively and efficiently drained by any existing well within the proration unit." Id.
at §§ 274. 204(f) & 271.305(b) (1979).
83. Id. at § 271.702-4 (1979). High-cost gas is defined at section 107 as:
For purposes of this section, the term "high-cost natural gas" means natural gas
determined in accordance with section 3413 of this title to be-
(1) produced from any well the surface drilling of which began on or after
February 19, 1977, if such production is from a completion location which is
located at a depth of more than 15,000 feet;
(2) produced from geopressured brine;
(3) occluded natural gas produced from coal seams;
(4) produced from Devonian shale; and
(5) produced under such other conditions as the Commission determines to
present extraordinary risks or costs.
15 U.S.C.A. § 3317(c)(1979).
84. Except for special categories that present extraordinary risks or costs, all
other high-cost categories are deregulated upon the effective date of the first in-
cremental pricing rule. 15 U.S.C.A. § 3331(b) (1979).
85. The maximum efficient rate of flow (MER) provisions are found at 18 C.F.R. §
271.804 (1979).
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is left to the discretion of the state regulatory body.8"
The filing requirements are separated into four sections: (1)
general application for determination; (2) notice by an operator or
purchaser for an increase in production; (3) determination of increased
production resulting from installation of enhanced recovery tech-
niques; and (4) designation that a well is seasonally affected.87
To initially qualify the well, the producer must file actual
production records-if not available, tax records or verified copies
of billing statements may be substituted if based on average produc-
tion for the 90-day period.8 Also, results of any tests measuring the
production capability of the well are required; if production tests are
unavailable and the maximum efficient rate of flow has not been
previously established,8 the producer must submit other records
which demonstrate that the well produced nonassociated gas at a
rate not exceeding an average of 60 mcf per production day during a
12-month period."
Section 271.805 allows a stripper well to remain categorized as
such, provided production does not rise above the qualifying flow
rate. 1 There are two exceptions to this rule. The first allows greater
than 60 mcf per day, provided the state jurisdictional agency deter-
mines that the production increase resulted from enhanced recovery
techniques and was not the result of the producer holding back pro-
86. "The conferees intend that the appropriate state or Federal regulatory body
with authority to make determinations under section 503, will determine what con-
stitutes application of recognized conservation practices." ENERGY GUIDELINES supra
note 50, at 3096-97.
87. See 18 C.F.R. § 274.206(a)(b)(c) & (d) (1979).
88. 18 C.F.R. § 274.206(a)(2) (1979) was amended to allow a summary of the con-
tents of the records or billing statements in lieu of the actual documents, if permitted
by the jurisdictional agency's filing requirements.
89. See note 85, supra.
90. 18 C.F.R. § 274.206(a)(3)(i) & (ii) (1979). If gas was not produced during the
90-day production period, the number of days and a description of the state law or con-
servation practice recognized or approved by the state agency which prohibited the
production must be filed. Id. at § (a)(7). If days were not included and production was
not prohibited by the agency, the applicant must state the number and reasons produc-
tion did not occur. Id. at § (7(U).
91. If it does, the operator must follow the procedures in 18 C.F.R. § 271.805
(1979) "Continuing Qualification" as well as give notice to parties under section
274.206(b). The required notice in section 271.805(a)(1) terminates the right of any seller
to collect the maximum lawful price in section 271.802 from the well identified in the
notice unless the jurisdictional agency acts on the petition to requalify the well accord-
ing to section 271.806. If the notice is filed by the purchaser, the operator has 30 days
from that date to oppose the allegation or seek the jurisdictional agency's affirmation
that the increased production was due to enhanced recovery methods or seasonal fluc-
tuations. Id. at § 271.805(d) (1979).
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duction, qualifying as a stripper well, then raising production while
retaining the benefit of the higher stripper price. The second excep-
tion allows a well that is "seasonally affected" to continue to receive
the stripper price, although production rises above 60 mcfs. The ap-
plication is similiar to the one for enhanced recovery, with the ex-
ception of requirements for 24-month production records and a
description of the nature of the seasonal fluctuations."
Alternative Minimum Filing Requirements
Section 274.207 "Alternative filing and notice requirements"
acknowledge that as FERC and the state commissions develop ex-
pertise under the NGPA, they may want to agree to other methods
of determining NGPA classifications within the statutory para-
meters. Recognizing this, states may file alternative producer filing
plans which may be approved by FERC.
REVIEW OF STATE DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE NGPA
Overview
After the notice requirements under the regulations" are com-
pleted, the FERC review process begins.9 ' Section 503(b)(1)(B) re-
quires that FERC make a determination of preliminary reversal
within 45 days of the state agency's notification of its determination
and a final finding to reverse within 120 days, or the state deter-
mination stands. 5 Thus, by the 46th day9" following notification
92. Id. at § 274.206(d) (1979).
93. When the determination is administratively final, the state agency is required,
within 15 days, to give written notice of the determination to FERC. Id. at § 274.104
(1979).
94. The Commissioner of Conservation's NGPA determination procedures imply
that an agency determination is administratively final only after the applicant has ex-
hausted his administrative remedies including the filing of a motion for rehearing. The
rehearing motion must be filed within 10 days after the determination is completed.
LA. RULE 4.6. The motion must contain one or more of the following grounds: (1) the
decision is clearly contrary to the law and the evidence; (2) the party has discovered
relevant new evidence which could not have, with due diligence, been obtained before
or during the hearing; (3) there is a showing that issues not previously considered
ought to be examined to properly dispose of the matter; or (4) further consideration of
the issues and the evidence would further the public interest. Id. at 5.1. The Commis-
sioner may either grant or deny the rehearing as well as abrogate or modify his
previous determination. Id. If he does not act on the motion within 30 days, the ap-
plication for rehearing is deemed to have been denied.
95. 18 C.F.R. § 275.202(a) (1979). FERC's review authority is contained in 15
U.S.C.A. § 3413(b) (1979).
96. 18 C.F.R. § 275.202 (1979). An incomplete notice under (b) keeps the 45-day
period from running until the jurisdictional agency and others are notified. Subsection
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by the state agency, one of three actions must have occurred: (1) a
preliminary finding to reverse was issued, (2) a preliminary finding
to remand was issued, or (3) the determination was deemed final
because of FERC's failure to act within the 45-day period. Neither of
the first two preliminary findings is subject to judicial review, being
in the nature of the Commission's exercise of its suspension authority
under section 205 of the Federal Power Act9" and section 4 of the
NGA 8 However, after they become final, both actions are subject to
judicial review: the court may order a reversal based on the
substantial evidence test or a remand under the arbitrary and
capricious standard.9
Scope of Review
The NGPA states explicitly that FERC, in exercising its review
function over the state agencies, may reverse only on grounds that
there is no substantial evidence in the record. This section 503
review is the same standard as that provided for judicial review of
FERC orders and rules under section 506... of the Act; nonetheless,
it is submitted that there are special differences between the scope
of review under the two sections. Section 506's review provision is
modeled after the NGA, and thus cases decided under the NGA may
be studied to discern the traditional definition of substantial
evidence as it relates to rate cases. In the Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases,1"' the Court stated:
Section 19(b) of the Natural Gas Act provides without
qualification that the "finding of the Commission as to the facts,
if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." More
important, we have heretofore emphasized that Congress has en-
trusted the regulation of the natural gas industry to the informed
judgment of the Commission, and not to the preferences of
reviewing courts. A presumption of validity therefore attaches
to each exercise of the Commission's expertise, and those who
would overturn the Commission's judgment undertake the heavy
burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid because
it is unjust and unreasonable in its consquences FPC v. Hope ...
We are not obliged to examine detail of the Commission's deci-
(c) provides for withdrawals of notice and applications and for public notice; and (d) for
procedures following a notice of preliminary finding by FERC.
97. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1976).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1976).
99. 15 U.S.C.A. § 3413(b)(4) (1979).
100. 15 U.S.C.A. § 3416 (1979).
101. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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sion; if the "total effect" of the rate order cannot be said to be
unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry is at an end."'2
The scope of review was limited by four factors: (1) the well-
known statutory substantial evidence standard; (2) the judicially
recognized "presumption of validity" implied from the Congressional
limitation; (3) the longstanding total effect test of Federal Power v.
Hope Natural Gas Co.,1°3 and (4) a zone of reasonableness to compen-
sate for the necessarily imprecise nature of cost determinations and
the inherent difficulties of the regulatory undertaking. ' Although
all four of these criteria could conceivably apply to section 503
determinations, the first two are the most relevant. The latter two
are inappropriate in the context of NGPA determinations, consider-
ing the difference in the nature of the proceedings for ratemaking
by FERC and in the NGPA state process. Without much statutory
guidance, other than that rates be just and reasonable, final
ratemaking decisions could be and probably were subjective on the
Commission's part. Thus, much concern was given by the reviewing
courts to insure that a proper record was made by the Commission.
At the same time, however, due to the inherent subjectivity in the
proceedings, the courts developed the "total effect" and the "zone of
reasonableness" tests, recognizing the uncertainties in ratemaking,
yet also attributing to the FPC a high degree of expertise.
The state agency's discretion in making determinations under
the NGPA is much more limited than the broad ratemaking power
granted the FPC under the NGA. The NGPA carefully prescribes
the factual circumstances which will justify the classifications. It
does not seem so great a burden, for instance, to document that a
well is 2.5 miles from another. The only category approaching a sub-
jective determination is the new reservoir definition, but even this
category is capable of documentation through credible objective
evidence. There is simply not much room for an abuse of discretion
at the state level, because what will constitute substantial evidence,
as far as FERC is concerned, is clearly defined.
In addition, the NGPA has made a fundamental change in
FERC's prior NGA authority to set prices. Congress has determined,
by passage of the NGPA, what are just and reasonable rates for cer-
102. Id. at 767 (citations omitted).
103. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
104. To illustrate, the Court in the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases noted that one
of the criteria for review of a rate order was "whether the order my reasonably be ex-
pected to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly compensate
investors for the risks they have assumed and yet provide appropriate protection to
the relevant public interests, both existing and forseeable." 390 U.S. at 792.
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tain higher-priced categories of gas based on projected production
responses."5 FERC, instead of setting the rates, is now limited to
determining whether correct factual determinations were made in
the qualification process.
As this review illustrates, the traditional substantial evidence
test, as it applies to the FERC review of state determinations, no
longer relies on a "zone of reasonableness" consideration nor a
"total effect" factor. What remains relevant from the NGA test,
however, is the judicially recognized "presumption of validity" im-
plied from the Congressional limitation of review."0 ' Since the NGPA
also requires that the scope of review be limited to the question of
substantial evidence, it is suggested that a state agency's determina-
tion should be given the same presumption of validity that courts
have given FERC actions under the NGA. It is not a novel idea that
a special agency's expertise in certain matters entitles its decisions
to a presumption of correctness, or at least puts that agency in a
better position to draw inferences from presented facts than can a
reviewing court or Commission.0 7 The fact that Congress assigned
this decisionmaking power to state agencies implies a recognition
that the conservation commissions, with their staffs of geologists
and technicians and with their proximity to the source of supply, are
best equipped to make the necessary factual findings and thus, their
work should be entitled to great deference. 0
105. 15 U.S.C. § 717r (1976).
106. The Statement of Managers notes that the Conferees intended that the ques-
tion of whether the state agency is supported by substantial evidence shall be a ques-
tion of law and may be reversed if not in accordance with the requirements of law.
ENERGY GUIDELINES supra note 50, at 3126. This statement may be interpreted to pre-
'Vent FERC from making any law-fact distinctions and to limit its review to an over-all
determination of whether the evidence, taken as a whole, affords a substantial basis
upon which to uphold the determination.
107. As Chairman Curtis noted after the NGPA had been passed:
I personally believe that from an administrative point of view the new direction is
both sensible and workable, and carves out an appropriate role for the states.
Under the NGPA, the applications must be verified by geological and production
records of the type which are generally maintained by state conservation commis-
sions. To the extent that on site inspections are required, the state agencies are
geographically well situated to fulfill this responsibility. To the extent that an ap-
plicant is required to make an appearance in connection with an application,
generally speaking the burden will be substantially less if the appearance can be
made in the state where production is located.
Hearing on Impact of Natural Gas Prices on Consumers Before the Senate Subcomm.
on Intergovernmental Affairs of the Governmental Affairs Comm., 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 27-29 (1979) (statement of Charles Curtis).
108. 18 C.F.R. § 275.203 (1979). Grounds for a protest are that the determination is:
(1) not supported by substantial evidence; (2) inconsistent with information contained in
FERC's public files and which was not part of the record in which the determination
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Protests to Jurisdictional Determinations
The standing requirement, regulating who may protest state
determinations at the FERC level, is very broad, giving the right to
"4any person" without a requirement that the protestor have previ-
ously appeared before the jurisdictional agency." 9 Much care has
been taken to assure that all parties wishing to appear and present
views in a gas determination have the opportunity to do so. Although
arguably within the purview of FERC's general rulemaking author-
ity under section 501, these procedures could run afoul of the rule-
making restraints announced in New England Power v. FPC,"'
which held that such a general grant of authority cannot be used to
expand the agency's substantive powers. The court, discussing pro-
visions similar to section 501 contained in the NGA and the Federal
Power Act, noted:
Both sections are of an implementary rather than substan-
tive character. The cases have made abundantly clear, that,
while these provisions must be read in a broad expansive man-
ner, they can only be implemented consistently with the provi-
sions and purposes of the legislation and that they authorize an
agency to use means of regulation not spelled out in detail, pro-
vided the agency's action conforms with the purposes and
policies of Congress and does not contravene any terms of the
Act. These sections merely augment existing powers conferred
upon the agency by Congress. They do not confer independent
authority to act.1
The point is that there must be a substantive provision in the
NGPA that justifies FERC's implementation of a rule under section
501. A strong argument could be made that the protest procedure
created by FERC does not conform with the purposes of the NGPA
and actually contravenes the intent of the section 503 delegation to
was made; (3) inconsistent with information submitted with the protest for inclusion in
the public records of FERC, which information was not part of the determination
record: or (4) was not based on an application which complied with the filing re-
quirements set forth in subpart B of part 274 (minimum requirements). Id. at §
275.203(b)(1) (1979).
109. The avowed reason for the inclusion of the protest procedure is that insuffi-
cient notice is given by the state agencies, in accepting and making NGPA determina-
tions, to interested persons other than to the parties to the proceedings themselves.
The protest procedure protects the rights of these third parties at the FERC level.
Louisiana has a broad protest procedure, see note 66, supra.
110. 467 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
111. Id. at 430-31, quoting Public Service Comm'n of New York v. FPC, 327 F.2d
893, 896-97 (2d Cir. 1964); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 158 (2d
Cir. 1967).
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the state agency of the authority to make specific factual determina-
tions. In effect, by allowing any party to present new evidence at
the FERC level, the implied intent of Congress to accord the deter-
minations of jurisdictional agencies a presumption of validity so long
as the substantial evidence standard is met is defeated. Instead, the
protest procedure invites parties to introduce evidence into FERC's
records which could transform FERC's appellate review function in-
to a trial de novo in explicit contravention of the statutory language.
FERC is not to "second guess" or independently weigh the jurisdic-
tional agency's evidence. Furthermore, in keeping with the review
function mandated by Congress, FERC should not be in the position
of receiving evidence de novo, just as a court of appeals is pro-
hibited from doing so in reviewing FERC orders under the NGA."'
In order to protect the state agency's grant of jurisdiction,
FERC could accept new evidence, provided some sort of extraor-
dinary cause can be shown as to why a similar presentation was not
made at the state level. For example, a valid basis for such a finding
may be that newly discovered evidence exists which is pertinent to
the determination. Louisiana's Conservation Commission recognizes
this as a factor justifying reconsideration."3 At the minimum, a pro-
testor at the FERC level should be required to justify his failure to
make an appearance at the state level before FERC allows the pro-
test.'
Judicial Review
Judicial review of final FERC actions pertaining to state deter-
minations is allowed only under the authority of section 503(b)(4)(B)
112. 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1976). The court may, however, should reasonable grounds
be shown for failure to adduce the evidence before the commission, order such
evidence to be presented before the commission.
113. LA. RULES 5.1(1)-(4). One jurisdictional agency suggested that it was inconsis-
tent with the NGPA to allow protestors to submit information with their protest, and
have that information become part of the "public records of the Commission," within
the meaning of section 503(b)(1)(B). FERC responded that such a procedure was re-
quired under section 501(a)'s authority to "issue . . . such rules and orders as it may
find necessary or appropriate to carry out its functions under this Act." One of its
functions is review of state determinations. Failure to consider reliable evidence sub-
mitted by a protestor within the 45-day review period would be unreasonable. ENERGY
GUIDELINES supra note 50, at 30,427-28.
114. 18 C.F.R. § 275.204(c) (1979) requires reasons for nonappearance at the state
level but does not provide any such strict scrutiny test. FERC rejected this complaint
noting that it could not prescribe procedures applicable to jurisdictional agency deter-
minations, and that the limited time it has in reviewing the state determinations,
would not allow for resolution of controversies over what constitutes good cause for
failure to appear. If experience illustrated abuse, FERC stated, it would consider
changing its protest procedures. See note 113, supra.
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& (c)(4).' Any person aggrieved or adversely affected by a final find-
ing of FERC may seek review in the court of appeals for any circuit
in which the party is located or has its principal place of business or
in the District of Columbia Appellate Court, provided a petition is
filed within sixty days after the determination is final. Review is
governed by a substantial evidence standard."' Given the propensity
of the appellate courts to give great weight to FERC's actions in the
past under the NGA, the review most likely will be narrow.
A conflict appears to exist between the intent of the conferees
as expressed in the Joint Statement of Managers and the provisions
of section 503(c)(4). The joint statement notes: "Nothing in this Title
(V) is intended to limit the jurisdiction of state courts to decide
questions of state law. A party aggrieved by procedural aspects of
state or Federal agency determinations may pursue whatever ap-
peal rights are otherwise available under state or Federal law.'. 7
This language conflicts with section 503(c)(4), which limits
judicial review of final FERC actions to federal courts of appeal. It
is suggested that this tends to "federalize" questions of state law,
notwithstanding the contrary language noted above. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that a state agency were to determine that certain natural
gas qualifies as new onshore production well gas under section 103,
but the decision is reversed by FERC on the ground that the well
was in a proration unit within the meaning of section 103(c)(3). While
the determination of what constitutes a proration unit is one of
state law, the only route for judicial review is apparently in federal
court under section 503. Thus, the state law question is removed to
federal court, contrary to the conferees' intent to allow state courts
to review questions of state law. It seems, however, that the only
reason for the question of what constitutes a proration unit to ap-
pear before a federal court is because the issue figures in the
115. Section 503(c)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 3413(c)(4) (1979) reads: "[alny such determina-
tion referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section made in accordance with procedures
described in paragraph (3) shall not be subject to judicial review under any Federal or
State law except as provided under subsetion (b) of this section." And section 503(c)(4),
15 U.S.C.A. § 3413(b)(4)(B) (1979) provides:
Any person aggrieved or adversely affected by a final finding of the Commission
under paragraph (1) may within 60 days thereafter file a petition for review of
such finding in the United States Court of Appeals for any circuit in which the
party involved in such determination is located or has its principal place of
business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
circuit. The reviewing court shall reverse any such finding of the Commission if
the State or Federal agency determination involved is supported by substantial
evidence.
116. Id.
117. ENERGY GUIDELINES supra note 50, at 3127 (statement of managers).
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classification of natural gas under federal law. It must be
remembered that FERC's standard and scope of review is a substan-
tial evidence standard mandated by the statute. All issues pertain-
ing to state law that come to mind immediately are carefully defined
in the NGPA. Should FERC attempt to substitute its judgment as to
which state laws are and are not preempted by the NGPA, the ag-
grieved party can certainly seek a reversal of the Commission's own
reversal on the grounds that the Commission exceeded its authority
under the Act.
Assuming FERC has the authority to decide issues of state law
subject to federal court review under section 503(b)(4)(B), the ques-
tion becomes whether there is any mechanism that will allow state
court participation. One route that does not appear to have been en-
visioned by the conferees is for the Federal court of appeals to
utilize Louisiana's certification procedure, whereby a federal court
can ask the state supreme court to answer questions of state law
which are determinative of the case. " 8 Since the federal reviewing
court under section 503(b)(4)(B) may only reverse FERC's decision
upon a finding that the original agency determination was supported
by substantial evidence, the applicant might instead urge that the
decision at the FERC level interpreting state law is not a "finding"
under section 503, but is, instead, a "rule" within the meaning of the
Federal Administrative Procedures Act," 9 being an agency state-
ment of "general applicability" and "future effect"; thus, the general
judicial review authorized in section 506(b) of the NGPA should be
available. 2 ° If an issue of state law is decided that, practically speak-
ing, FERC will necessarily apply in future determination reviews,
the federal court, for comity reasons, might consider this alter-
native.
CONCLUSION
The increasing depletion of the nation's producing states'
hydrocarbon resources opens up the possibility of increasing strains
118. LA. R.S. 13:72.1 (Supp. 1972) states:
The supreme court of this state may, by rule of court, provide that when it
shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States, or to any court of ap-
peals of the United States, that there are involved in any proceeding before it
questions or propositions of the laws of this state, which are determinative of the
said cause, and there is no clear controlling precedent in the decisions of the
supreme court of this state, such federal appellate court may certify such question
or propositions of the laws of this state to the supreme court of this state for in-
structions concerning such questions or propositions of state law, which certificate
the supreme court of this state may, by written opinion, answer.
119. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976).
120. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 3416(b) (1979).
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between those states that have and those that do not. The federal
government has decided to referee these competing interests in the
natural gas area by passage of the NGPA. While economists may
disagree as to the arguments for and against decontrol, the fact re-
mains that Congress has entered into the debate and will inevitably
do so again. Thus, the real concern should be the federal govern-
ment's understanding and proper respect for the states' historic and
future autonomy, with the goal being active cooperation rather than
confrontation.
Fortunately, the agency charged with implementation of the
NGPA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, appears to
understand this relationship. Two recent examples of willingness to
cooperate with the state agencies are the alternative filing require-
ment regulations and the rules on the determination of tight sands
reservoirs. FERC has accepted a proposal, filed by the New Mexico
Oil Conservation Division, which allows the applicant to satisfy the
requirement that a new well be necessary to effectively and effi-
ciently drain a portion of a reservoir within an existing proration
unit without submitting the "appropriate geological evidence and
engineering data" to demonstrate this fact every time a well is drilled.
The fields have been the subject of hearings by the Conservation
Division, which decided that the existing proration units could not
be effectively and efficiently drained by the existing wells. Thus, the
applicant may satisfy the above requirement by specifying the ap-
propriate New Mexico order authorizing an infill well drilling pro-
gram.121 This procedure will streamline NGPA determinations
without sacrificing the policies of the Act.
Another rule which promotes cooperation with the states is
FERC's decision to grant state agencies the authority to nominate
tight sands for Commission approval. Recognizing that the jurisdic-
tional agencies have the best access to the production history and
geological information relating to potential tight formations, the rule
did not specifically identify formations, but rather established
guidelines for identification of the sands. The state agencies will
establish their own procedures, conduct their own investigations,
and submit their written recommendations to FERC, which will then
review the nomination. Originally, the rule would have set criteria
and allowed FERC to make the initial determination. 2 ' It is hoped
that this spirit of cooperation will continue.
This article has outlined the possibility and promise of state and
federal cooperation in the implementation of the NGPA determina-
121. ENERGY GUIDELINES supra note 50, at 30,844-48.
122. Id. at 30, 900-20.
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tion process. The real lesson of the NGPA, however, as evidenced
by the debate during the bill, is not what state and federal agencies
can eventually accomplish together, but instead what the President
and the Congress in its future energy deliberations should consider
before they intrude unnecessarily upon areas of practiced state con-
trol. As then-Congressman Krueger noted when the NGPA first left
the House Ad Hoc Energy Committee: "Like the mule, this policy
can have no pride of ancestry nor hope of posterity. It is the sterile
offspring of economic naivet6 and political expedience. Congress
must address, not avoid, our national energy problems." 2 '
Regardless of the social purposes envisioned, political "expe-
dience" should never preempt the consideration of views of those
people closest to the action which is being regulated. By involving
states in the deliberation process at an early stage, no action
delegated to the states by the federal government need suffer delay,
as did the Jarndyce case.
123. H.R. REP. No. 543, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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